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Canada’s Amendment Rules: A Window into the Soul of a Constitution 
Review essay 




Many years ago, while watching returns from the Quebec secession referendum, Richard 
Albert fielded a telephone call from the Yale football coach who hoped to recruit him as a student-
athlete.1 As the yes and no sides traded leads on the TV screen, Albert and the coach shared 
thoughts about Quebec and the US experience of secession and civil war. The date was October 
30, 1995, the night the referendum failed by a razor-thin margin.2 Fascination with that moment 
in time led Albert to scholarly prominence today, 25 years later.3 With his work spanning an 
encyclopedic range of historical, theoretical, doctrinal, and comparative themes, Albert may now 
be the world’s leading scholar on constitutional amendment.4 Years in the making, Constitutional 
*New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, ISBN 9780190640484
**Professor emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I thank Richard Albert for inviting me to
participate in a panel discussion of Constitutional Amendments at the Conference on Constitution-Making and
Constitutional Change, at the University of Texas Law School (January 17-18, 2020); I also thank the editors for
inviting me to participate in this special issue of the Manitoba Law Journal.
1 Author Interview, Constitutional Amendments; https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/just-published/2019/10/15/author-
interview-constitutional-amendments-making-breaking-and-changing-constitutions.
2 The referendum question asked: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a
formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership, within the scope of the bill respecting the
future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995”? The turnout for the referendum was 93.52%,
and voters rejected the secession option, voting “no” by a margin of 50.58% to 49.42% for yes.
3 Author interview, supra note 1. Albert reports being “riveted” by the comparisons and contrasts between the two
countries.
4 Albert has countless scholarly articles, edited books, special law journal issues, and projects to his credit. His
principal book publications include R. Albert & D. Cameron, eds., Canada in the World: Comparative Perspectives
on the Canadian Constitution (“Canada in the World”)(UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018); R. Albert, P. Daly &
V. MacDonnell, eds., The Canadian Constitution in Transition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019); R.




Amendments explains how amendment rules define a constitution’s integrity, ensuring its 
longevity by allowing and even inviting formal changes to its text.5  
 Constitutional Amendments is prodigious and monumental, connecting abstract issues of 
textual design to the follies of constitutional amendment over diverse variables of time and place. 
Canada’s story is there too, though only as part of a complex narrative on constitutional change in 
Japan, the United States, South Korea, Brazil, and countless nation states whose amendment 
experiences are profiled. Albert’s sweep of the subject is so complete that even if the Kingdom of 
Bhutan is not discussed, little else is overlooked.6  
Albert’s journey was driven by an intellectual curiosity and persistence that traces to home, 
the histrionics of Canada’s constitutional patriation in 1982, and its aftershock reforms, the Meech 
Lake and Charlottetown Accords.7 These at times harrowing events generated a contemporaneous 
literature that is rich, but introspective in its focus on why constitutional reform failed so 
dramatically after 1982.8  With the passage of time, a renewal of interest in Canada’s amendment 
 
5 Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions (UK: Oxford University Press, 2019) 
(“Constitutional Amendments” or “Amendments”). 
6 I have teased Albert about Bhutan, a constitutional monarchy with a constitution that was adopted in 2008. 
7 The Constitution was “patriated” through statutory amendments to incorporate textual amendment rules; 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11, Sched.B.  Five years later, on April 30, 1987, the first ministers reached 
agreement on the Meech Lake Accord, which proposed amendments aimed at rectifying Quebec’s exclusion from 
patriation (the “Quebec Round”). Following a difficult history, the MLA failed three years later, on June 23, 1990. It 
was followed by the Charlottetown Accord, also known as the “Canada Round” of constitutional reform, which 
addressed the deficiencies of the MLA by proposing a comprehensive package of constitutional amendments. After 
negotiations were completed on August 28, 1992 the Accord was voted down in a nationwide referendum held on 
October 26, 1992; see infra note 70. 
8 See, e.g., Keith Banning and Richard Simeon (eds.), And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy and the 
Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1983); Roy Romanow, John Whyte and Howard Leeson, Canada 
… Notwithstanding- The Making of the Constitution 1976-1982 (Canada: Carswell/Methuen, 1982) 
[Notwithstanding]; Robert Sheppard and Michael Valpy, The National Deal: The Fight for a Canadian Constitution 
(Toronto: Books, 1982) [The National Deal]; Edward McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution, 1979-1982: 
Patriation and the Charter of Rights  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) [Canada and the Constitution];  
Ron Graham, The Last Act: Pierre Trudeau, the Gang of Eight, and the Fight for Canada (Canada: Penguin Canada, 
2012) [The Last Act]; Patrick Monahan, Meech Lake: The Inside Story (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) 
[Inside Story];  Andrew Cohen, A Deal Undone: The Making and Breaking of the Meech Lake Accord (Vancouver: 
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constitutionalism, led principally by Albert, offers fresh perspective.9 In this, he is uniquely 
positioned as an inside-outside observer: a Canadian who came of age at the time of the 1995 
secession referendum and developed an abiding intellectual interest in amendment processes 
worldwide. Over the years, Albert developed a complex theory of amendment that is enriched by 
a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Constitutional Amendments thrives on the mysteries of 
constitutional change everywhere, including and especially in Albert’s homeland.  
Other reviews that linger on the author’s theories and comparative perspectives may bypass 
the book’s implications for Canadian amendment constitutionalism. This review takes a different 
approach, offering a form of patriation that brings Albert home and highlights the relationship 
between his conception and Canada’s experience of constitutional amendment.  
Mapping his amendment template onto domestic experience is no simple task, and the 
modest goal, for now, is to look selectively at concepts that offer insight into Canada’s amendment 
narrative. Specifically, this review draws on Albert’s work to suggest a simple but sharp insight 
linking the 1867 Constitution’s failure to provide textual rules to the steadfast unamendability of 
 
Douglas & McIntyre, 1990) [Meech Lake Accord]; Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan (eds.), The 
Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) [The 
Charlottetown Accord]; Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?, 2nd 
edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) [Odyssey]; and Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: 
Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian Constitution (Canada: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994) 
[Reimagining Canada]. 
9 See, e.g., Albert, Daly & MacDonnell, The Canadian Constitution in Transition, supra note 4; Lois Harder and 
Steven Patten (eds.), Patriation and Its Consequences: Constitution Making in Canada (Canada: UBC Press, 2015); 
Richard Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada”, Alta. L. Rev., 53 (2015), 85-114; Richard 
Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Stealth”, McGill L.J., 60:4 (2015), 673-736; Richard Albert, “The Conventions 
of Constitutional Amendment in Canada”, (2016) 53 O.H.L.J. 399 (addressing aspects of Canadian amendment 
constitutionalism); Kate Glover, “Structure, Substance & Spirit: Lessons in Constitutional Architecture from the 
Senate Reform Reference”, S.C.L.R.,  67 (2nd edition) (2014), 221-255; and Kate Glover, “Complexity and the 
Amending Formula”, Constitutional Forum, 24:2 (2015), 9-16 (exploring the relationship between constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional amendment). 
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the Canadian Constitution.10 More than twenty-five years after the Charlottetown Accord failed 
on October 26, 1992, the Constitution may be more “frozen” than ever.11 Yet in taking the country 
to the brink of dissolution, patriation and the Accords overshadowed the longitudinal history of 
constitutional change. Canada’s amendment dilemma is not only a byproduct of patriation, but 
traces to the genesis of the Constitution in 1867 and its primal failure to provide textual rules for 
change.    
Albert offers a conceptual framework for placing Canada’s amendment constitutionalism 
in perspective. Of primary importance in Constitutional Amendments is Albert’s profound regard 
for rules and conviction that amendment rules are a “window into the soul of a constitution”.12  If 
a constitutional text that lacks amendment rules is essentially unamendable, it is difficult to fathom 
how Canada’s Constitution functioned for about 115 years without such rules. At the least, how 
that oversight or congenital defect affected its constitutional “soul” raises intriguing and unsettling 
questions. In addition, “amendment rigidity” and “constructive unamendability” are two of 
Albert’s focal concepts that also have salience for Canada. While the study of rigidity focuses on 
the relative threshold of amendment difficulty and whether textual rules can make constitutions 
too difficult to amend, “constructive unamendability” incorporates the organic variables outside 
 
10 This review deals with “multilateral” amendment under the 7/50 and unanimity provisions of the Constitution, 
and not forms of amendment that do not require the participation and agreement of the provinces, collectively, 
and federal government. Canada Act 1982, supra note 7, Part V, ss. 38-49. The provinces and federal government 
can make unilateral amendments under ss. 44 and 45, and bilateral amendments relating to some but not all 
provinces are governed by s.43. Sections 38-40 and 42 address the general amending formula, or 7/50 
requirement, and s. 41 specifies five amendments that require the unanimous consent of Parliament and all 
provinces.  
11 R. Albert, “The Frozen Constitution”, Runnymede Society, Summer Speaker Series, July 9, 2020 (explaining how 
and why constitutional amendment in Canada is “frozen”). 
12 Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 2. 
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of text – the synergies of amendment culture – that can frustrate and undermine a text’s 
prescriptions for amendment.13  
In the process of transformative change, Canada learned that manipulating amendment’s 
legality, or rules, could not close a legitimacy gap that did not arise for the first time during 
patriation and the Accords. Historic in nature, this gap was already ingrained in amendment 
culture; as such, it illustrates how the synergy of rules and Albert’s forms of unamendability reflect 
core concepts of legality and legitimacy. Accordingly, his concept of a constitution’s soul is not 
limited to the legal or formal rules for change but, in fundamental terms, must include their 
legitimacy as well. As Canada’s history demonstrates, a process of amendment that lacks 
legitimacy can compromise and even jeopardize a constitution’s soul.14  
Amendment matters15 
 Without more, Albert’s command of his subject, worldwide and from every analytical 
vantage, is a feat of scholarly and intellectual magnitude. Notably, his diligence is in furtherance 
of a deeper quest for order in the processes of constitutional amendment, which stems from his 
faith in text, and belief that “[n]o part of a Constitution is more important than its rules of 
change”.16 No wide-eyed idealist, Albert is well aware of sham constitutions and “authoritarian 
commandeering”, both which subvert a constitution’s lofty aims for unprincipled or nefarious 
 
13 See generally, ibid. at 95-172 (Part Two: Flexibiliy and Rigidity).  
14 On legitimacy, see generally R. Fallon Jr., “Legitimacy and the Constitution”, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787 (2005) 
(categorizing and describing three conceptions of a constitution’s legitimacy, including its sociological authority or 
acceptance by the democratic community). See also J. Cameron, “Legitimacy, Legality and Constitutional 
Amendment in Canada”, in Albert & Cameron, eds., Canada in the World, supra note 4, at 98 (discussing the 
relationship of legality and legitimacy in Canada’s history of constitutional amendment). 
15 Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 2 (stating, “I show in this book how amendment works and why it 
often fails, what we can learn from various designs around the world, and why amendment matters in 
constitutionalism; emphasis added). 
16 Ibid. at 261. 
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purposes. Stating that examples “abound” of “suspicious amendment design”, he explains that 
exploiting the amendment process to consolidate authoritarian powers or establish dynasties 
perverts the essential morality of a constitution.17 Parenthetically, a case in point is the referendum 
of June, 2020, which approved amendments to the Russian Constitution empowering current 
President Vladimir Putin potentially to remain in office up until 2036.18 Aware of those dynamics 
and the myriad ways a constitution’s morality can be compromised, Constitutional Amendments 
seeks to ennoble the amendment process, enfolding it in a framework of principled design. Though 
a nation’s ambient constitutional culture may pose challenges, Albert has at least provided a 
blueprint to follow in making, breaking, or changing its constitution. 
Chapter by chapter, Constitutional Amendments builds toward a high-level, structural 
template that can guide the design and implementation of textual amendment rules. The work-up 
culminates in a chapter titled “The rules of law”, which pivots around four matrices that address 
the foundations, pathways, specifications, and codification of amendment rules.19 Whether in 
making or amending constitutional text, the goal is to align design variables with the prerogatives 
of an amendment culture, and fashion a text that finds resonance with, and expresses a 
community’s constitutional soul. In Albert’s words, the “prime objective” is to create rules of 
change that “keep the constitution stable and true to popular values but always changeable when 
necessary”.20  As suggested above, a constitution’s soul should be understood holistically to 
embrace its sociological legitimacy as well as the formal legality of the rules for change.  A 
 
17 Ibid. at 49-51. 
18 “Russia Plans July 1 Vote on Putin’s Constitutional Amendments after Coronavirus Delay”, The Moscow Times, 
June 1, 2020; online https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/01/russia-plans-july-1-vote-on-putins-
constitutional-amendments-after-coronavirus-delay-a70447; “The Theatrical Method in Putin’s Vote”, The New 
York Times, July 1, 2020; online https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/world/europe/putin-referendum-vote-
russia.html  
19 Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 261-71 (“Conclusion - The Rules of Law”). 
20 Ibid. at 271. 
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constitution’s supreme or sovereign status is its soul and the source of its legitimacy in the 
community.  
It is axiomatic in Albert’s conception that amendment rules stand “atop the constitution’s 
hierarchy of norms” and sit “at the base of its architecture”.21 He is passionate that rules of this 
stature cannot be taken for granted, but must be thoughtfully designed. When “carefully 
constructed and deployed with deliberation”, amendment procedures “translate popular 
preferences into law while balancing these preferences against the most fundamental values in the 
polity”.22 Amendment rules are legitimizing because they separate constitutional text from 
ordinary legislation, presenting a concept of constitutionalism, creating a framework of structural 
and institutional confidence, and defining a sovereign community’s relationship with change over 
time. Formal rules “telegraph when and how a constitution changes”, producing “legislatively or 
popularly validated changes that are accepted as authoritative”.23 The stakes in defining a 
constitution’s mechanism for adaptive change are high, because amendment rules expose a 
constitution’s “deepest vulnerabilities” and reveal its “greatest strengths”.24  
No constitutional text is perfect or immutable, and rules are time- and culture-bound, often 
malleable, and frequently fallible.  Moreover, history’s pageant is far too undependable to make 
textual calculations impervious to the interventions of chance. Constitutional Amendments 
illustrates how unpredictable constitutional change can be, and how communities adapt, managing 
imperfect texts and dysfunctional systems of amendment. In this pageant, Canada’s amendment 
history is at least idiosyncratic and even bizarre. To begin, the 1867 Constitution’s failure to 
 
21 Ibid. at 2. 
22 Ibid. at 39. 
23 Ibid. at 269. 
24 Ibid. at 2. 
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provide for its own amendment is a phenomenon of constitutionalism that invites ongoing pause 
and reflection.25 From Albert’s perspective, a text without amendment rules is “not a reasonable 
option in the modern world.26 As Edmund Burke notably observed, “a state without the means of 
some change is without the means of its conservation”.27 Against that backdrop, it is difficult not 
to view this congenital defect as one of the Canadian Constitution’s “greatest vulnerabilities”. 
Contrary to expectations, the Constitution remained unamendable even after the 
entrenchment of amendment rules in 1982. Rather than liberate the process from the anomalies of 
surrogate legality by the UK Parliament, Part V’s amendment rules were less than authoritative 
after patriation, when both Accords set standards for validation that were not constitutionally 
required.  Failed reform led to the present, in which constitutional amendment is subject, both 
formally and informally, to a bewildering cacophony of textual, statutory, and unwritten rules.28 
To recap, in the space of about twenty years, Canada swung wildly from a protracted history of no 
rules for change to a status quo of too many rules.29   
 Amendment rigidity has been a constant in Canadian constitutionalism, before and after 
patriation, and with or without rules. As noted, amendment rules must both pause and permit 
change, calibrating a balance aimed at a form of adaptive continuity that can preserve a 
constitution’s legitimacy over time. Amendment standards must be rigid enough to protect the 
 
25 The focus is the written Constitution and its failure to prescribe rules for amendment of the text, and not the 
unwritten Constitution, defined in the main though not exclusively by the Westminster tradition of parliamentary 
government, including the principles of responsible government and unwritten constitutional conventions. 
26 Constitutional Amendments, ibid. at 271. 
27 Quoted, Ibid. 
28 See infra note 72 (providing a list of extra-textual requirements).  
29 J. Cameron, “Legitimacy, Legality”, supra note 14, at 119, fn 85 (stating that “[e]xtra-textual constraints aimed at 
enhancing the legitimacy of amendment complicate and obscure the process, and delegitimize the rules for 
change”). See also R. Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada”, supra note 9 (explaining that 
in making the Constitution impossible to amend, extra-textual restrictions weaken democracy and undermine the 
purpose of “writtenness”). 
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integrity of the founding text, and sufficiently flexible to preserve its vitality. A text that is 
amended simply and frequently as a matter of routine might struggle to establish its status and 
legitimacy as a constitutional instrument.30 Otherwise, however, onerous amendment rules can 
valorize the original text, risking dissonance between the imperatives for change and a static, 
unresponsive, master text.31 The scholarship on amendment rigidity measures the relative 
difficulty of constitutional amendment across variables but, as Albert explains, presents 
methodological issues and challenges.32 Because it does not easily fit the model, Canada has not 
been included and plotted on the rigidity spectrum, in part because – at least historically – 
unamendability was grounded in the absence, not the presence, of rules.33 
Albert privileges the role of text and formal rules without overlooking the dynamics of 
constitutional and political culture. Specifically, he recognizes that rules are only part of the 
narrative, because the formalities of amendment legality sit within a culture that can exacerbate or 
relax the process of change.34 Countless in scope and variety, the variables and contingencies that 
affect amendment’s chances can accelerate, redirect, or incapacitate constitutional change. Outside 
the limits of text, uncodified factors can be at work, undermining and incapacitating constitutional 
amendment. In this way, ambient constitutional politics can place added pressure on reformers to 
perform “impossible heroics” for amendment to succeed.35 As noted above, the dynamics of 
amendment culture describe a vital relationship between the rules or legality, and the legitimacy 
 
30 Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 271 (noting that “hyper flexibility” is inadvisable because it erodes 
the distinction between a constitution and a statute). 
31 Ibid. at 255 (noting that “the text never appears in any other way than perfected”) and 271 (stating that 
unamendability exposes the “exaggerated self-assurance the authoring generation has in itself”). 
32 Ibid. at 95-105. 
33 Ibid. at 105-10 (“The Missing Case of Canada”); see also Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in 
Canada”, supra note 9. 
34 Ibid. at 110-19. 
35 Ibid. at 95, 158-9. 
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of constitutional change. Legality works in tandem with legitimacy, and though the two typically 
align, gaps may be present at the moment of constitution making, or may surface over the life of a 
constitution. These gaps and deficits can embed in the constitutional politics, conditioning cultural 
responses to change. 
Shortfalls in amendment legitimacy were at least nascent in 1867 when Canada adopted a 
constitution that did not address the legality of textual change. Though not inevitable, those 
shortfalls or gaps deepened with the evolution of federalism, and widened to a point of 
unamendability after Canada achieved formal independence in 1931. The lack of rules led to a 
stalemate that rendered Canada’s Constitution impossible to amend, at least until the heroics of 
patriation intervened. That is when the pattern was broken a single time in 1982, before deeper 
and more tenacious forms of unamendability surfaced, despite and even because of the newly 
entrenched rules.  
The culture of amendment, its evolution over time, and engagement with the legitimacy of 
change are critical features of Canada’s amendment history. The Constitution’s unamendability 
describes a complex interaction, in which the standards for amendment continued to shift, without 
success, to accommodate ongoing legitimacy deficits. In principle, when the legality and 
legitimacy of constitutional amendment are aligned, heroics should not be necessary. Canada’s 
Constitution is unamendable at present because there are no more heroics and, in the meantime, 
these core elements remain misaligned.  
11 
 
Amendment rules: the soul of a constitution 
 Stalled for more than 50 years after Canada’s independence in 1931, the impasse on 
constitutional amendment ended with the brinkmanship of patriation.36 Though Canada is not now 
at risk of dissolution, as it was in the 1990s, its chronic unamendability may be the Constitution’s 
deepest vulnerability.  Largely untested to this point, Part V may offer Canada its best chance of 
addressing and resolving its amendment dilemma. For that to happen, Canada must re-consider 
the status quo of extra-textual, supplementary burdens on constitutional reform, and accept the 
legitimacy of Part V’s amending formulas.   
Amendment without rules: 1867-1982 
 In its own pragmatic way, Canada straddled the line between British and American 
tradition, adopting a constitution “similar in nature to that of the United Kingdom” that mimicked 
some of the structural features of its US counterpart.37 The fledgling dominion of Canada united 
four colonies under a written constitutional text that incorporated the unwritten rules and principles 
of British constitutionalism. The British North America Act, or BNA Act, borrowed the concept of 
federal union from the United States, but edged it toward unitary features, enriching the federal 
government’s powers and pronouncing it paramount over the provinces.38 Meanwhile, 
parliamentary supremacy, the mainstay of Westminster constitutionalism, co-existed with a 
written constitution, a textual division of powers, and a system of judicial review and constitutional 
interpretation.39  
 
36 Ibid. at 210-13 (“Time and Brinkmanship”). 
37 Preamble, British North America Act 1867, 30-31 Vict., c.3 (UK). Re-named the Canada Act, 1867, supra note 7. 
The 1867 Constitution is referred to here as the BNA Act here, for historical purposes. 
38 Textual elements of the federal government’s paramount status include the power to disallow provincial 
legislation and appoint the lieutenant governors of the provinces (ss. 58, 90, and 55-57), as well as the peace, 
order and good government power, the 27 heads of enumerated power, and the deeming clause of s.91. Ibid. 
39 Judicial review by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council evolved under the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 28-29 




On the surface, Canada’s pre-textual amendment history was relatively quiet. Prior to 
independence under the Statute of Westminster, amending the Constitution was an exercise in 
cordiality, because it was carried out, at one remove, through a process of statutory legality by the 
UK Parliament. At Confederation, there was little awareness that the lack of textual rules posed an 
obstacle, because imperial sovereignty provided a solution. The BNA Act was a constitutional text, 
but also an imperial statute that was subject to parliamentary supremacy and amendment by the 
UK Parliament.40 Under the principle of legislative sovereignty, the British Parliament could 
amend or repeal any statute, including the BNA Act. Rather than exercise its power to amend the 
BNA Act unilaterally, the UK Parliament recognized Canada’s autonomy to amend the 
Constitution. Not long after 1867, unwritten conventions of imperial governance crystallized; these 
conventions established that the UK Parliament would only amend the Constitution at Canada’s 
request and would enact amendments sought by the federal government.41 
In hindsight, the Constitution’s failure to prescribe rules for change was not merely an 
unfortunate omission but, more fundamentally, a primal flaw in the BNA Act’s structure and text.42 
Not surprisingly, it became progressively more difficult, and then impossible, for Canada to 
legitimize constitutional reform in the absence of formal rules, or any framework of constitutional 
legality. Though the 1867 Constitution was amended more than twenty times prior to patriation, 
the proxy of statutory UK legality was not sustainable.43 In the first instance, the process bypassed 
the provinces, whose interests were engaged by any amendment that affected their jurisdiction or 
 
40 Colonial Laws Validity Act, ibid. 
41 P. Monahan & B. Shaw, Constitutional Law, 4th ed., at 174 (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2013). 
42 Note that some amendments could be undertaken domestically; see, e.g., ss. 55, 52, 40, 51, 35 and 18 
(pertaining to “housekeeping” matters in the House of Commons and Senate); s.92(1) (provincial constitutions); 
and s.91(1) (the admission of new provinces). 
43 Monahan & Shaw, supra note 41, at 165. 
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powers.44 As Canada evolved, the provinces flourished and a robust view of provincial autonomy 
was instantiated in the jurisprudence.45 Whatever was intended at the point of Confederation, 
excluding the provinces from the amendment process increasingly posed an affront to federalism.  
In addition, the lack of amendment rules bizarrely prevented Canada from achieving 
sovereignty under the Statute of Westminster, which in 1931 released Canada and other 
Commonwealth dominions from the vestiges of imperial rule.46  The dilemma for Canada was that, 
by definition, independence would terminate the practice of surrogate amendment by the UK 
Parliament. Absent that legality or any other form of amendment rules, the BNA Act was at risk of 
being altered by ordinary statutes enacted either by the federal government or any of the provinces. 
Because there would be no legal rule to prevent or prohibit it, a lack of amendment legality 
prevented Canada from achieving full independence.47 To address that defect and protect the 
integrity of the Constitution, the BNA Act was excepted from provisions in the Statute of 
Westminster granting Canada its independence.48 The anomalous lack of textual rules meant that 
Canada could only achieve amendment sovereignty by entrenching a process of legality, or textual 
rules, in the Constitution. In the meantime, the UK Parliament would continue to act as a “bare 
 
44 The UK convention considered requests for amendment by the federal government as legitimate, and the lack of 
rules in the BNA Act meant that the provinces had no legal authority to prevent the federal government from 
proceeding unilaterally. Cameron, “Legality, Legitimacy”, supra note 14, at 108. 
45 See, e.g., Hodge v. the Queen (1883) 9 App.Cas. 117, at 132 (declaring that the provinces are “supreme” and 
have authority that is as “plenary and ample” under s.92 as the federal government’s under s.91). 
46 1931, 22-23 Geo. 5. c.4, s. 4. 
47 P. Hogg, “A Comment on the Canadian Constitutional Crisis” (1980), Yale Studies in World Public Order 285-96, 
at 286, 289 (acknowledging this risk). 
48 s. 7, Statute of Westminster, supra note 46 (stating that nothing in the Act applies to the repeal, amendment, or 
alternation of the BNA Act). 
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legislative trustee”, amending the Constitution indefinitely, until Canada settled its domestic rules 
for constitutional change.49 
Though a combination of imperial sovereignty and statutory legality spared Canada the 
ignominy of being legally unable to change its Constitution, seeking amendments through a 
surrogate foreign legislature was more demeaning after 1931. The federal government followed 
the colonial amendment process for the last time in 1949, and no amendments were attempted 
between 1964 and 1982.50 Meanwhile, the first ministers, comprising the prime minister and 
premiers of the provinces, negotiated without success on a process for domestic constitutional 
amendment.51 Two core challenges could not be overcome. Agreement on the formal rules for 
amendment was one obstacle, but the partners to Confederation also had to decide what threshold 
of agreement was required to endorse those rules.52 Once those issues were resolved, Canada could 
invite the UK Parliament to work “the old machinery” one more time and “patriate” the 
Constitution.53  
If it was not the objective, negotiations at the level of executive federalism tended to point 
toward a standard of unanimity, either as a default expectation or imperative – the realpolitik – of 
federalism.54 Short of unanimity, formulas that would advantage some regions or provinces in the 
 
49 Justice I. Rand, “Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism” (1960) 38 Can. B. Rev. 35, at 45 (describing 
Canada’s unique situation and the UK’s role in “effecting the will of Canada”). 
50 Cameron, “Legality, Legitimacy”, supra note 14, at 113. 
51 Over the course of fourteen high-level meetings between 1931 and 1982, the process of executive federalism 
failed to produce agreement on an amending formula. Cameron, “Legality, Legitimacy”, ibid., at 111. See generally, 
J. Hurley, Amending Canada’s Constitution: History, Processes, Problems and Prospects (Canada: Minister of Supply 
and Services Canada, 1996). 
52 The two thresholds might not necessarily mesh; negotiations could require or expect all first ministers to agree 
on rules for change that did not require unanimity for all amendments. 
53 Sir William Jowitt, quoted in Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753, at 795 (“the Patriation 
Reference”). 
54 According to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, “we took the idea of unanimity and made it a tyrant…. We were led 
by the dictates of unanimity to bargain freedom against fish, fundamental rights against oil, the independence of 
our country against long-distance telephone rates”. Quoted in Graham, The Last Act, supra note 8, at 68. 
15 
 
amendment process, at the expense of others, threatened the equal status of all.55 Proposals along 
such lines were untenable because they could not satisfy the demands of Canada’s evolving system 
of federalism.   
From the perspective of Constitutional Amendments, a written constitution’s failure to 
anticipate its own amendment is a source of deep vulnerability. Even as the UK Parliament’s role 
as a surrogate had diminishing legitimacy, there was a vacuum on the legality of amendment. The 
years stretched to decades and the vacuum could not be overcome because no form of amendment 
legality could succeed without aligning with the demands of legitimacy which, at the time, were 
focused on the constitutional politics of Canadian federalism. The impasse could not be broken 
without heroics that achieved amendment legality, but did so at the expense of its legitimacy.  
Amendment rules and impossible heroics: patriation and the Accords   
 
 Canada’s version of constitutional “heroics” prompted forms of brinkmanship that 
exacerbated existing gaps and generated additional deficits of amendment legitimcacy. Although 
patriation may have been a constitutional “miracle”, the “night of the long knives” gambled 
Canada’s future on the decision to isolate Quebec.56 Whether Quebec’s perceived exclusion from 
constitutional reform made a remedial process necessary or inevitable remains a matter of debate 
and opinion. Amid Quebec’s self-proclaimed alienation from the “rest of Canada” (ROC) and a 
rising focus on separation, the “Quebec Round” of reform and MLA was celebrated in 1987 as a 
nation-saving miracle.57 Consequently, it is difficult to overstate how serious the fallout was, not 
 
55 The Victoria Charter, 1971 failed because Ontario and Quebec were the only provinces granted a veto on 
amendments. Cameron, “Legality, Legitimacy”, supra note 14, at 112. 
56 This is a legendary part of the patriation saga and the catalyst for the MLA. See generally Graham, The Last Act, 
supra note 8, chapters 14 (“The Kitchen Accord) and 15 (“The Night of the Long Knives”), at 190-98 and 201-11. 
57 The MLA proposed amendments that recognized Quebec as a distinct society; required the federal government 
to grant provinces a greater role in immigration and to select Supreme Court of Canada judges from lists of names 
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only in the moment but for the course of constitutional amendment, when the Accord faltered three 
years later, on the final day of the ratification period.  
Thirty years ago, on June 23, 1990, the MLA expired after two provinces, Manitoba and 
Newfoundland, failed to ratify. During the countdown, the MLA’s prospects for ratification were 
not improved after then Prime Minister Mulroney put out a boast that he called the last-minute 
first ministers meeting to roll the constitutional dice.58 The suggestion that reluctant premiers were 
pressured and manipulated further undercut a fragile agreement – one that emerged from a dinner 
meeting that famously lasted seven days – to ratify the Accord in exchange for a promise to address 
other issues on the reform agenda, forthwith.59 The MLA’s failure meant that Canada had said 
“no” to Quebec for the second time, and led to Quebe’s ultimatum setting October 26, 1992 as the 
deadline for constitutional reform or the alternative of a secession referendum.60 The 
Charlottetown Accord was valiant but flawed; remarkably, the Accord was reached within an 
impossible deadline that averted the threatened referendum on separation. Yet, as explained below, 
the Accord’s package of reforms was too bloated to pass muster in a nationwide referendum.  
In combination, patriation and the Accords marked a period of unprecedented histrionics 
in amendment history. Both Accords were undercut by the relentless pressures and complex 
 
from the provinces; entrenched Quebec’s right to three judges on the Court; and allowed the provinces to opt out 
of share cost programs, under certain conditions; and granted all provinces a veto on s.42 amendments. See 
Monahan, Inside Story, supra note 8, at 297-305 (Appendix 3, text of the MLA), pp. 306-14 (Appendix 4, 1990 
Constitutional Agreement). 
58 In an interview, the prime minister stated, in an attempt to pressure hold-out premiers to ratify the MLA, that 
“It’s like an election campaign. You’ve got to work backwards. You’ve got to pick your dates and move backward 
from it. I said (to my aides) that’s the day that I’m going to roll all the dice. It’s the only way to handle it” (emphasis 
added).  See online, “A Long Day for Canada: On the Death of the Meech Lake Accord”, Los Angeles Times, June 26, 
1990: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-06-26-wr-662-story.html   
59 Monahan, The Inside Story, supra note 8, chapter 8, at 198-237 (“This Dinner Has Seven Days”). 
60 Quebec announced that with or without a constitutional overture from the rest of Canada there would be a 
referendum on separation no later than October 26, 1992. 
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dynamics of constitutional politics that were put in motion by patriation. An unstable amendment 
culture was pivotal in sealing the fate of each. Then Premier Bourassa may have captured the mood 
well when he stated – when pressured to re-open the MLA to a wider reform agenda – “I can’t 
accept a compromise on a compromise on a compromise”.61 That sentiment was shared widely, at 
the level of executive federalism and by Canadian voters who considered the Charlottetown 
Accord a massive exercise in crass, unacceptable compromise.62   
 Looking past the prevailing political environment, the central point in this discussion is 
Part V, and what went wrong with the textual rules.  Rather than facilitate reform, embedding a 
series of amending formulas failed to lead the Constitution through the high-stakes processes that 
followed patriation.  In bypassing Part V and its requirements, the two Accords deflected attention 
from patriation’s singular achievement, which was the entrenchment of textual amendment rules.63 
Rather than facilitate reform, embedding a series of amending formulas failed to lead the 
Constitution through the high-stakes processes that followed patriation.  Instead, both Accords 
raised or changed the threshold of agreement required by Part V. While only some of its provisions 
were subject to that threshold, the MLA set unanimity as the holistic standard of ratification.64 
Likewise, the Charlottetown Accord’s wide-ranging mixture of reforms was subject to different 
Part V rules, which do not include a process or requirement of popular confirmation. Though Part 
V does not mention or even contemplate a referendum as part of the process, a nationwide 
 
61 Quoted in Monahan, The Inside Story, supra note 8, at 209. 
62 The Accord included a distinct society clause for Quebec as well as a Canada clause for the ROC; it addressed the 
division of powers, institutions of federal government, linguistic rights, and rules for amendment. It has been 
described as “a set of largely ad hoc trade-offs, unsupported by a vision of the country as a whole”. J. Webber, 
Reimagining Canada, supra note 8, at 175. 
63 Patriation’s other achievements include the incorporation of Aboriginal rights and the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
64 Packaging amendments subject to the general amending formula and the requirement of unanimity introduced 
another obstacle in the form of a 3-year ratification period for all parts of the MLA. Constitutional Amendments, 
supra note 5, at 209. 
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referendum asked voters to take or leave the Charlottetown Accord’s disparate reforms on an all 
or nothing basis.  
An onlooker, such as the notional reader of Constitutional Amendments, could readily 
wonder why Canada did not apply the 1982 rules to the Accords.  Generally, reform processes do 
not proactively seek riskier and more onerous approaches to change than what is prescribed by the 
constitution. For Canada, the difficulty was that patriation, including Part V, achieved the long-
awaited goal of constitutional legality, but lacked legitimacy. Rules that were elusive for most of 
Canada’s history, and which in 1982 were intended to anchor the Constitution, lacked authority 
because they were not legitimate in Quebec. This was the most immediate deficit, but not the only 
one. More profoundly, the prevailing politics of amendment reflected a chronic but shifting 
condition of Canadian constitutionalism – after patriation, the gap branched out from its roots in 
amendment federalism to embrace tensions and expectations arising from a perception of reform 
as an exercise in popular democracy. Part V’s requirements were supplemented, but cross-cutting 
dynamics that would not be – or were not – managed nonetheless felled both Accords. 
Rather than resolve issues, patriation served to aggravate pre-existing questions about the 
legitimacy of amendment. Emblematic of the vaccum on amendment constitutionality was the 
Supreme Court’s curious 1981 ruling that unilateral patriation by the federal government was legal, 
but unconstitutional.65 Stepping back, it is difficult to imagine a more stunning admission of the  
disconnect between the concepts of legality and legitimacy: formal legality was inadequate to 
confer constitutional legitimacy. The gap between concepts revolved around the status of 
 
65 Patriation Reference, supra note 53. Seven of the Court’s nine judges agreed, with two in dissent, that that the 
federal government had the legal power to amend the Constitution unilaterally; a differently constituted majority 
of six judges also found that the federal government’s unilateral patriation plan was unconstitutional because it 




provincial consent, and although the Supreme Court found unilateral patriation unconstitutional, 
it refused to specify what quantum of provincial consent was required. Against decades of 
negotiations that at least gestured toward unanimity, albeit without attaining it, that omission 
essentially granted the federal government permission to proceed with the “substantial” consent of 
the provinces.66  After the Court’s decision, a final round of negotiations in November 1981 
culminated in the betrayal of Quebec and patriation over its objection and perceived exclusion 
from the agreement.67 
As a matter of legality, Quebec was not entitled to veto the patriation amendments.68 Even 
so, the perception and claim that the 1982 Constitution would not be legitimate in Quebec unless 
the province became a signatory was compelling. By restoring Quebec’s constitutional status and 
standing, the MLA would legitimize patriation, including Part V’s amendment rules, once and for 
all.  A ratification standard of unanimity served to boost the legitimacy of the Accord by 
demonstrating the ROC’s goodwill toward Quebec. The MLA’s underlying logic was somewhat 
unconventional. The 1982 amendments that were both legal and constitutional under the Supreme 
Court jurisprudence would be legitimized after the fact by the MLA, which reverted to unanimity 
and essentially bypassed Part V.  Without expressly granting Quebec a veto, the MLA  validated 
unanimity as the standard of amendment.  
In the hurry to include Quebec in the Constitution, the MLA marginalized the textual 
amendment rules, rendering them dispensable and secondary to the goal of celebrating Quebec’s 
 
66 Ibid. at 905 (stating that a substantial degree of provincial consent was required and that “[n]othing more should 
be said about this”). Significantly, the Court found that the rule of unanimity “under which past constitutional 
conferences labored and ultimately failed” was not a conventional – or constitutional – requirement. Romanow, 
Whyte and Leeson, Notwithstanding, supra note 8, at 188. 
67 The “Night of the Long Knives” was the critical moment in the negotiations that took place after the Patriation 
Reference. Supra note 56. 
68 Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 SCR 793. 
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re-entry to Confederation. At the same time, unanimity raised the stakes in the ROC, where 
asymmetric arrangements for Quebec demanded patience while other promises and expectations 
for constitutional reform were placed on hold.69 The legitimacy of the MLA, which was fragile 
from the outset, declined in the three-year ratification period from 1987 to 1990. In the end, it was 
not only the MLA that failed in this process, but Part V as well. 
The next miracle was that much more difficult to achieve. One lesson from the MLA was 
that the ROC’s pent-up demands for constitutional reform could not be ignored, and were therefore 
added to the urgent task of achieving reconciliation with Quebec. Against insurmountable odds 
and while straining against the clock, the Charlottetown Accord set out a bulky proposal for 
monumental change across institutions and issues. The “Canada Round” gambled that a package 
offering placatory reforms across a spectrum of issues, to a host of constitutional stakeholders, 
would be difficult to refuse. The other lesson from the MLA, that the democratic community could 
not be excluded from the process, did not save the Canada Round. The Charelottetown Accord 
lacked legitimacy in the democratic community and was punctured in a nationwide referendum 
rejecting the package.70 That defeat set Canada and Quebec on the path to the 1995 secession 
referendum, which was the starting point of this review. With constitutional heroics falling short 
a second time, it was once again not just the Accord that failed, but Part V as well. 
 
69 The need for reform was not lessened by “the limited success of 1982”, because there were other unresolved 
constitutional dilemmas including, in addition to Quebec, issues relating to aboriginal peoples, the Senate, the 
Supreme Court of Canada, and economic union. Romanow, Whyte & Leeson, Nothwithstanding, supra note 8, at 
276-78. 
 
70 The Accord passed muster in four of ten provinces and was defeated, in the popular vote, by a margin of 54.3% 
against and 45.7% in favour. P. Monahan & K.McRoberts, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, Appendix 3, “Official 
Voting Results by Province”, supra note 8. 
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Not long after the patriation negotiations of fall 1981, when asked whether he considered 
the agreement a success, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau replied, “No, I consider it an abject 
failure”.71 From an amendment perspective, the rules incorporated in Part V achieved 
constitutional legality but left in place a legitimacy gap that widened over the course of the two 
Accords. Quebec’s exclusion created a dangerous gap in legitimacy that was compounded by the 
MLA, which lacked legitimacy in the ROC, both on matters of substance and process. At a time 
of profound distrust and pessimism it became impossible for the Charlottetown Accord to mitigate 
the damage or generate the confidence and goodwill needed to legitimize a reform package that 
asked too much of the democratic community.  
After 1982, the dynamics unleashed by patriation made it difficult for the Accords to 
ground Part V’s rules in an amendment culture that, essentially, had been re-set. Nor did their 
failure, under more onerous requirements for ratification, restore or generate confidence in the 
textual rules. Instead, Canada continued its search for proxies of legitimacy. At present, 
constitutional amendment is governed by a complex combination of Part V rules, federal and 
provincial statutes, constitutional jurisprudence, and conventional requirements.72  
 
71 Quoted in Monahan, The Inside Story, supra note 8, at 14. 
72 Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 128-31 (“Statutory Conditions on Codified Amendment Rules”). 
See, e.g., An Act representing constitutional amendments, S.C. 1996, c.1 [Regional Veto Act] (prohibiting 
constitutional amendments from being proposed unless certain provinces have consented, namely Ontario; 
Quebec; British Columbia; at least two Atlantic provinces representing at least 50% of the population; and at least 
two of the three prairie provinces having at least 50% of the population). While Alberta and British Columbia 
require a binding referendum before their legislatures can approve constitutional amendments; other provinces 
and territories authorize but do not require their government to call a binding or advisory referendum to validate 
constitutional change. It is widely thought that legitimacy demands a national referendum to validate Part V 
amendments to the Constitution. In addition, Supreme Court of Canada decisions constrain the amendment 
process: see the Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, [1998] S.C.J. No 61 (and the Clarity Act, S.C. 
2000, c.26); Reference re Supreme Court Act ss.5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433 and Reference re Senate 
Reform 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704 (placing judge-made caveats and qualifications on the substance and 
process of constitutional amendment); Amendments, ibid. at 223-27 (“Pre-ratification Review in Canada”).  
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One of the misfortunes of Canada’s amendment history is that the Accords disrupted and 
undermined Part V’s functionality as the text’s prescribed mechanism for constitutional change. 
As Albert has observed, the statutory conditions “now exercise a constitution-level constraint on 
the constitution’s rules for formal amendment”, despite “not earning their special status through 
the channels the constitution requires for achieving constitutional status”.73 
Today, Canada’s amendment constitutionalism suffers from a form of hyper rigidity, which 
emanates from multiple sources inside and outside the constitutional text. Both because and in 
spite of the multiplicity of rules, it remains unclear what amendment legality requires. Textual 
change is also in a state of paralysis due to constructive unamendability, because Canada’s 
constitutional culture has not articulated and might not know what a legitimate process of 
constitutional reform looks like. It is an experience that remains outside its amendment narrative. 
On their face, Part V’s amending formulas are strict enough to ensure a rigorous process 
of constitutional amendment.  In combination, the rules facilitate constitutional change that falls 
within the sole jurisdiction of the federal government or provinces, or is bilateral in nature.74 
Otherwise, the threshold rises for amendments that engage the interests of federalism or implicate 
national institutions, such as the head of state. Under ss.38 and 41, constitutional amendment 
proceeds only when high levels of agreement can be reached.75 These requirements are difficult to 
meet, but are generally consistent with the types of proposals that were widely discussed and 
negotiated prior to patriation.  
 
73 Ibid. at 131. 




Part V’s textual rules should be accepted and engaged as the governing standard for 
constitutional amendment. Pausing a moment, the need to make an appeal to the formal rules is in 
itself an interesting comment on the state of amendment constitutionalism in Canada. The 1982 
solution to a history of amendment incapacity may not be perfect, but balances the competing 
interests in regulating the content and pace of change. The framework is sufficiently demanding 
to deter amendments that lack sufficient support, as a matter of federalism, because it sets a 
workable threshold for agreement. Put another way, Part V’s calibrations are pragmatic and 
reflective of the reality of Canadian federalism. 
Part V’s rules should govern any reform process in the future, albeit with these comments 
and caveats. First, and in large part because of Canada’s failed reform initiatives, Albert expresses 
skepticism about the viability of omnibus amendment bills, proposing instead a “single subject” 
approach requiring every amendment be addressed and ratified as a discrete constitutional 
change.76 At the least, it is clear that the Charlottetown Accord’s omnibus package, which was 
attempted under conditions of constitutional duress, was deeply flawed. Without necessarily 
endorsing Albert’s single-subject approach, constitutional change going forward should at least 
match proposed amendments up with the requirements of Part V. Packaging a mix of reforms 
together that are subject to differing and upgraded ratification requirements is unnecessary and 
decreases the chances of success in constitutional amendment. 
Second, the status of popular confirmation or ratification as a functional requirement of 
reform is an open question. To the extent it is a de facto requirement, a referendum process would 
be more effective if implemented through co-operative arrangements between the federal 
 
76 Constitutional Amendments, supra note 5, at 186-88. 
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government and provinces. Complex and overlapping statutory requirements clutter and confuse 
the process, once again limiting the hope of successful reform. At minimum, there should be a co-
ordinated and transparent referendum and single vote across the nation. 
Meanwhile, it is unlikely in the extreme that the current impasse on amendment will be 
broken or resolved by superimposing overarching forms of extra-textual legality onto Part V. Such 
gestures deepen the rigidity and unamendability of the Constitution without shoring up its 
legitimacy. To that point, such means are counterproductive, because they diffuse and confuse the 
core question of what makes constitutional change legitimate. Requirements that supplement Part 
V are the product of constitutional politics and an amendment culture rendered dysfunctional by 
the lack – over most of Canada’s history – of any concrete sense of amendment legality, or 
constitutional sovereignty. Filling the vacuum by proliferating and escalating the threshold for 
amendment cannot circumvent or resolve the core issue: that the legitimacy of constitutional 
amendment remains unsettled. A surfeit of overlapping and onerous requirements serve more to 
impossibilize the amendment process than to find and voice the missing legitimacy.  
Rules: a constitution’s deepest vulnerabilities and greatest strengths  
 
 My own experience of both Accords has affected my response to Albert’s intense focus on 
the formalities of textual amendment rules. While I have much admired him for undertaking a 
project of such great intellectual challenge, my lingering question was whether an exclusive focus 
on text could offer sufficient or penetrating insight on the challenges surrounding constitutional 
change. In candid terms, my bias was that static rules did not seem like the most interesting or 
critical element in any process of amendment and reform. That view was informed by my own 
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moment in time, when I was placed in the midst of highly charged and unpredictable events that 
disregarded and marginalized Part V’s rules.77   
Much later, I have learned from Albert’s cumulative scholarship, including Constitutional 
Amendments, that Canada’s amendment constitutionalism has much to learn from his work on the 
formal legalities of constitutional change. It is clearer to me now that the noise, the crises of 
patriation and the Accords, the Constitution’s chronic unamendability, and the intense dynamics 
of amendment culture are, at their heart, a function of longstanding and unresolved issues with 
amendment rules. The lack of textual rules, Part V’s defeasible authority after patriation, and the 
superimposition of more and more rules after the Accords validate Albert’s central claim that “no 
part of the Constitution is more important than its rules of change”.78 As argued above, with the 
events of patriation and the Accords in the distance, it is time to revisit the question of amendment 
rules and do so from the perspective that Part V’s framework for change is both legal and 
legitimate. 
Writing on the 30th anniversary of the MLA’s failure, it is tempting to imagine what might 
have happened had the Accord been ratified. Constitutional reform would not have been over but, 
in light of the promises and expectations on hold, would only just have begun. The regional 
divisions and lack of generosity in the pervasive amendment culture suggest that achieving further 
reforms would present a mighty challenge.  It is difficult to know whether Part V’s rules would 
have been followed in any subsequent round of reform, or whether a referendum might have been 
 
77 Specifically, I was part of a team of expert advisors who accompanied the premier of Ontario to the first 
ministers dinner and 7-day meeting in June 1990, and signed the MLA’s “distinct society” letter; in addition to 
appearing before parliamentary committees and attending and speaking at the Renewal of Canada Conferences, I 
was appointed to the National “Yes” Committee during the Charlottetown Accord referendum campaign. Due to 
COVID-19, I have not had access to my office and to my personal archives and library, and was unable to use those 
materials in this review. 
78 Supra, note 27. 
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added. In other words, it is unclear what the legitimacy of constitutional amendment might have 
looked like had the MLA been ratified.  Still, it is unlikely that the overlapping and sequential 
requirements now in place would have become necessary. Contentious as it was, the MLA offered 
an opportunity to correct the patriation process with constitutional grace and at relatively low 
constitutional cost, given what followed. Its failure catalyzed a further trajectory that complicated, 
defeated, and demoralized the prospects for change. That demoralization includes Part V’s rules 
for change. 
Albert cites Edmund Burke’s observation that a state without the means of change is a state 
without the means of its own conservation.79 Canada has mishandled the amendment file 
throughout its constitutional history. Dramatically, and despite the self-inflicted wounds of the 
Accords, the Constitution and nation survived the turmoil surrounding the incorporation of textual 
rules. Ironically and paradoxically, this history shows strength as well as vulnerability. The 
protracted unamendability of the Constitution is a clear source of vulnerability that moved 
decisively in the wrong direction after patriation. As suggested, Canada’s ongoing amendment 
vulnerability can be ameliorated, at least in part, by accepting that Part V’s rules govern the process 
of constitutional reform. Whether that is realistic in the foreseeable future remains to be seen. 
There is strength, too, in Canada’s untidy history of amendment, including the colossal 
failure of two Accords. Contrary to what Albert might hope, its constitutional resilience does not 
rest, principally, in a commitment to textualism and the formality of rules. It is found, instead, in 
an uncanny capacity, over time and through difficult challenges in effecting change, for pragmatic 
adaptability. This adaptability does not conform to principle and is quite unpredictable but does, 
 
79 Supra, note 27. 
27 
 
in a way, define Canada’s as yet unformed and still emerging relationship with amendment rules 
and that part of its constitutional soul.  
 
  
 
